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Efficiencies in Health Care Regulation:
Observations Near and Far
John D. Blum, JD., M.H.S."

I. INTRODUCTION

Multiple layers of regulation scatter the landscape of American health

care as virtually every aspect of health delivery is in some fashion affected
by regulation. From very basic entrance requirements, such as those
dictated by licensure, to more esoteric and complex directives like those
found in Medicare fraud and abuse areas, government regulations impact
and increasingly define the enterprise of health care delivery.' Capturing the
essence of health regulation proves difficult, as the area serves various
purposes: from protecting the public's health, to providing the operative
details of a given program, to addressing the broader concerns of cost,
quality, and access.
Health regulation constitutes an enterprise, which proliferates with the
problem of the day, and existing regulatory schemes are rarely reevaluated
or abolished prior to issuance of newv requirements. From the standpoint of
the regulated, dealing wvith a myriad of mandates churned out at all levels of
government, as well as in the private sector, constitutes an expansive and
ever-present operational challenge. Curiously, although the health sector is
so profoundly impacted by regulation, evaluation of regulatory
interventions tends to be rather narrow and typically spurred on by cost
considerations and politics.2 Broad-based evaluation of health regulations'
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1. See generall' HEALTH LAN HANDBOOK, 2003 EDITION (Alice Gosfeld ed.,
WestGroup 2003) (1989) (covering a wide range of health law topics, which generally
provides readers with a sense of the scope of the regulatory area in health care).
2. Countless reports, emanating from Congressional oversight committees to the work of
the General Accountability Office, analyze virtually every legislated health program. While
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impacts on fundamental health policy concerns, such as the overall quality
of population health, occurs infrequently and tends to be highly speculative.
In fairness, the challenges of ascertaining the short and long term effects of
any regulatory scheme are complex, and when that undertaking is geared
toward measuring effectiveness of regulations on health, such enterprise is
clouded with ambiguity, lacks clear bench marks, and is highly susceptible
3
to the biases of evaluators.
This essay explores the broad question of the effectiveness of health care
regulation while the collective body of public and private regulation
impacts the quality of health care generally. This article analyzes regulation
in its broadest sense as a combination of administrative rules and program
directives based on legislation, rule making, contractual obligations, and
voluntary acquiescence. In turn, the concept of quality is cast in a global
fashion, beyond traditional concepts of structure, process and outcome, to
broad considerations of our entire health delivery system's effectiveness to
support individual and population health needs. Inherent in this global
notion of quality is the promotion, via regulatory intervention, of the core
goals of health policy - namely, clinical quality, cost effectiveness, and
individual access to services. This essay presents a modest attempt to make
observations about the highly complex and eclectic arena of health care
regulatory evaluation, and in no way purports to do more than point out
directions of inquiry and posit several general considerations that may be
useful in sparking future analyses. The general inquiry of the effectiveness
of health regulations on quality considers whether the overall expenditures
required by our extensive regulatory system enhance the overall stature of
American health care. In approaching the question of value for money, this
essay will consider the current nature of health regulations, the question of
what those regulations cost, and conclude with an examination of
comparative national expenditures on health. The three areas noted will
serve as a springboard for several concluding observations about the need
for future analyses of American health care regulatory policies.

such reports are highly detailed, they tend to be rather narrowly cast. In addition, the
executive branch issues countless reports each year exploring particular government

programs.
3. For an excellent example of an analytical document that attempts to look at the sum
total of health care regulation, see generally AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE
OlN RtGULATOR), RnI1FF AND REFORM:

FINAL REPORT (Oct. 2002), http://www.aha.org/

ahaikeyissues/reg-relief/content/boardregrefrep02l0.doc. This Report presents a detailed
discussion of regulation in the hospital sector and makes a number of suggestions for reform
which may be noteworthy, but must be viewed in the context of self-interest,
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I1. HEALTH

REGULATIONS: FORMATS, MEASUREMENTS, AND
COMPARISONS

All three branches of government heavily scrutinize health regulations,
but they typically restrict such examination to the details of a given
regulatory initiative: or, in the case of the judiciary, examinations are
restricted to the viability of a given legal challenge concerning aspects of a
particular regulatory scheme. 4 However, what is collectively known about
regulations in health care tends to be speculative and often reflects strong
commentator biases, usually in the case of the regulated.5 Achieving a
collective vision of health regulation is complicated by the fact that
regulatory initiatives are triggered for a variety of reasons from broad,
fundamental public health protections, to providing programmatic
operational details, to addressing varying types of problems in the delivery
system.
Further complicating the ability to achieve a comprehensive portrait of
regulation is the fact that governments at all levels (federal, state, and local)
frequently mount new regulatory initiatives and alter and expand existing
programs- the same can be said for private sector regulators such as the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO). 6
Even the most fundamental regulations, such as licensure and core program
operating directives like those encountered in Medicare, tend to be fluid as
new problems or developments in the health delivery system change the
rules. The development of problem-oriented regulations present a common
pattern in regulation, centering on addressing individual issues of the day
and issue-oriented regulation is often poorly integrated with existing
mandates. Politics drive issue-oriented regulation, which frequently results
in both the federal and state levels regulating the same set of problems in
ways that are often poorly harmonized. 7 Broadly speaking, it seems
4. Medicare is an excellent example of a regulatory program that undergoes constant
evaluation at the legislative and executive levels of government, and is often an area
subjected to a myriad of legal challenges. See generally COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE,
MASTER MEDICARE GUIDE (2006), available at http://hr.cch.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll.
Interestingly enough, a House Appropriations Committee Report has sparked an ongoing
examination of the whole process of health regulation at the federal level. See generally
H.R.
REP.
No.
108-636
(2004),
available
at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/T?&report=hr636&dbname= 108& [hereinafter HAC Report].
5. See generally AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 3.
6. Joint
Commission
on
Accreditation
of Health
Care
Organizations,
http://www.jcaho.org (last visited April 1, 2006).
7. A good recent example of regulatory duplication can be seen in the area of patient
safety, where many states have enacted regulatory schemes, on the heels of which quickly
followed a new regulatory program. See generally JILL ROSENTHAL & MAUREEN BOOTH,
NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, DEFINING REPORTABLE ADVERSE EVENTS:
A GUIDE FOR STATES TRACKING MEDICAL ERRORS, (2003), http://www.premierine.net/al/

HeinOnline -- 15 Annals Health L. 311 2006

[Vol. 15

Annals of Health Law

reasonable to argue that health regulations are extensive, layered, and
disjointed.
A. Regulatory,Formats
A general lack of consensus about the most appropriate mechanisms of
health care regulation further confounds the challenge of achieving
regulatory effectiveness. Even the most ardent critic of government health
care regulation would concede that some types of interventions are needed
to promote basic public health goals in access, cost effectiveness, and
quality. However, even occasional agreement on the need for regulation
does not translate into consensus about the appropriate manner of
regulation.
Typically regulatory goals are actualized through established legal
requirements, such as administrative rulemaking, that dictate the processes
and structure of given mandates. On the other hand, many would point out
the practical and theoretical undesirability of such interventions. In fact, a
fundamental tension exists between those who favor a bureaucratic,
governmentally directed regulatory process and those who see the market as
the most effective lever of control. Beyond the extremes of the free market
approach and traditional administrative rulemaking lay several other
regulatory pathways that have emerged, including private or voluntary
regulation, which are all geared toward implementing some manner of
oversight and control on the health sector.9
In 2003, the American Hospital Association convened a Task Force on
Regulatory Relief and Reform ("AHA Task Force") which identified seven
primary forms of regulation encountered in the hospital sector, including:
command and control (rulemaking), public utility regulation, inspection,
reporting and disclosure, performance based regulation, delegated
advocacy/trustees/docs/nashp-reporting-adverse-events.pdf; see also Patient Safety and
Quality Act of 2005, Pub.L.No.109-41,119 Stat.424 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C § 299).
8. Honorable Jon Kyl, Heritage Lecture: What is True Medicare Reform? 4, 10-11 (Oct.
23, 2003), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCareHL805.cftm?
renderforprint= I; see generally AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: GOVERNMENT, MARKET
PROCESSES, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Roger D. Feldman ed., Transaction Publishers 2000)
(discussing the benefits of free markets in health care); see generally' FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION &
COMPETITION

DEPARTMENT

(July

OF JUSTICE,

IMPRO\ IN,

HEALTH

2004),

CARE:

available

A DOSE

OF

at

http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/O40723healthcarerpt.pdf.
9. Sec generally BETTY LEYERLE, THE PRI\ ATE REGULATION OF AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE (M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1994). A growing academic movement has embraced the concept

of new. governance, which promotes alternatives to traditional regulation. For an example of
this, see Louisc G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equaliti': Healthcare Governance in
Transition, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 395, 410-15 (2003).
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regulation, and market regulation.' 0 While the AHA Task Force found that
command and control regulation was by far the most dominant model in the
hospital arena, it concluded that none of the identified regulatory formats
were satisfactory.'' In fact, the AHA called for the development of new
regulatory models, which can better balance the needs for public controls
with the realities of meeting such mandates on the part of the regulated.' 2 It
seems reasonable to conclude that from the health care industry side in
particular, a general dissatisfaction with how health care is currently
regulated is a common sentiment, and from the legislative and bureaucratic
perspectives, it would be unlikely that a consensus over how best to
regulate health care can be achieved.
B. Measuring the Costs

Yet another complicating factor in trying to develop a collective sense of
the effectiveness of health care regulation is the surprising lack of accurate
information on the cost of regulation. Detailed information available about
regulatory costs only exists in the context of given programs, stemming
largely from budget and appropriation processes and agency analyses, but
such oversights rarely capture a sense of overall costs, particularly those
involving compliance. An accurate sense of the costs of developing,
implementing, and complying with health regulations is lacking, and further
meaningful cost/benefit analyses of regulatory programs rarely exist.
Dr. Christopher Conover, a Duke University health economist and a
leading authority on health care economics, writes about the notion of "topdown" cost analysis, referring to the development of a general sense of
health care regulatory costs garnered via comparisons between health and
other industries.13 According to Conover, a "top-down" analysis on health
care costs would be based on consideration of the percentages of gross
economic activity in health care, in comparison with other industries such
as aviation or telecommunications where regulatory costs are better
known. 14 While this "top-down" approach to costs is rudimentary and
flawed, it is more meaningful than the current intuitive manner of
concluding that health care regulatory costs are high, springing from a
logical, but speculative, conclusion of costs based on volume of activity.
On the other hand, the case for high regulatory costs, which rests on the

10.

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 3 at 4.

11.

Id. at app. E/Hospital Regulation/I: A New Blueprint for the Future.

12.

Id. at 1.

13.

Christopher J. Conover, Health Care Regulation .4 $169 Billion Hidden Tax, 527

Cato Inst. Pol'y Analysis 3 (2004).
14.

Id.
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sheer volume of regulation, is often buttressed by a more acute sense of
expenditures on the part of the regulated, which results from the escalating
costs of compliance that continues to expand with new and changing
mandates. 5
The Cato Institute published a detailed study of health care costs
conducted by Conover in 2004 which examined costs from a range of state
and federal health care regulatory programs. The study included regulation
of health facilities, health professionals, health insurance, drugs, and the
costs of medical liability.16 The Conover study classified costs in four
ways: government regulatory costs, compliance costs, indirect costs, and
social welfare costs. The study concluded that the annual cost of health
services regulation exceeds $339.2 billion.' 7 The study attempted to
balance the total costs against benefits and based on this analysis concluded
that the expense of health regulation outweighed the benefits two-to-one,
costing the average American household $1500 per year. 18 The details of
the Conover study are beyond the scope of this essay, but the effort, while
laudable, is very much an initial foray into a highly complex and unsettled
arena. Clearly, more research on health regulatory costs, and on the even
more elusive area of deciphering the benefits of regulation, needs to be
conducted. However, the overall point that regulatory costs are excessive
and appear to outweigh the benefits is a most compelling observation,
calling into question the effectiveness of the health care regulatory
enterprise.
C. Comparisons
Weighing the effects of our regulatory system as a whole against other
nations presents another way to measure the effectiveness of U.S. health
care regulations collectively. Undoubtedly, there are some who would
question the value of a comparative approach to the question of regulatory
effectiveness, arguing that such an endeavor is fatally flawed because there
are too many differences across the spectrum of national health systems to
make such an exercise worthwhile. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in
developing comparisons is the dearth of measurements about health care
system indices in other countries in contrast to the United States, which is
heavily engaged in generating system measurements of every sort.
Beyond the lack of comparative data, major differences make

15. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Cost of Caring: Key Drivers of Growth in Spending in
Hospital Care, 17-18 (2003), available at http://pwchealth.com/pdf/caring.pdf.
16. Conover, supra note 13.
17. Id. at 4-6, 18.
18. Id. at 1.
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comparisons of regulatory intervention problematic, from the overall public
nature of many health systems to wide variations in population
characteristics. Even in countries that have strong similarities to the U.S.,
such as Canada, there are marked differences in the structure and financing
of their health systems. Key Canadian health policy issues, such as user
fees and waiting lists, lack comparable weight south of the border. 19 Still,
in the developed nation context, there are strong similarities in the nature of
challenges faced by government regulators, such as devising effective cost
controls, improving quality outcomes, increasing efficiency of delivery
systems, moving health care into a more information based mode,
controlling administrative costs, and limiting the growth of resources
attributed to the sector. Such challenges are coupled with parallel interests
on the part of regulators in developed countries, including promotion of
information technology, adoption of patient safety measures, evaluation of
the effectiveness of medical care, development of clinical practice
guidelines, etc. Thus, the noted challenges and the resultant interests serve
as a compelling basis for consideration of how other nations approach
health care regulation, with particular focus on expenditures and outcomes
in light of major gaps in comparative data and system disparities.
For purposes of this essay, the gross domestic product (GDP), which
entails aggregate spending on health generally, will serve as a frame of
reference for comparison. There should be a correlation between health
GDPs and the amount a nation spends on health care regulation, although
such a correlation must be carefully examined on an individual country
basis. The GDP, when correlated with key health outcome measures,
becomes a barometer against which to probe the effectiveness of a national
health system. It may also serve as a gauge to examine whether a given
nation is pursuing optimal regulatory strategies.
The U.S. GDP devoted to health is now over 15% totaling $1.9 trillion.
This far exceeds Germany, which has the second highest health GDP of
11.5%, followed by Switzerland at 11%.20 The U.S. health GDP stands in
stark contrast to other industrialized nations. 2' The average American
family spends $5267 on health care every year, compared with a median

19. Nadeem Esmail & Michael Walker, How Good is Canadian Health Care? 2005
Report, FRASER INST. 2005 CRITICAL ISSUES BULL. 8 (2005), available at
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/files/HowGoodlsCanHealthCare2005 .pdf.
20. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Health Data
2005: How Does the United States Compare, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/
23/34970246.pdf [hereinafter OECD]; see also Gerald F. Anderson et al., Health Spending
in the United States and the Rest of the Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 903-14

(2005).
21.

See OECD, supra note 20.
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expenditure of $2193 in the developed world.22 When the American health
GDP is considered against standard public health system outcome
measures, such as life expectancy, childhood immunization, and medical
service utilization patterns (i.e. doctor visits, hospital admissions, use of
prescription drug), the U.S. does not always fare so well. 23 Serious
questions must be raised about the costly American health system, which
ranks 19th in infant mortality globally and achieves life expectancies lower
than many other industrialized nations.
A sea of international public
health statistics could be quoted to make the case that there is something
fundamentally amiss in the way in which money is spent in the American
health system, with special concerns for very high expenditures in areas
such as paperwork and bureaucracy.
In relation to regulation, raw GDP numbers do not indicate what amount
is attributable to government regulatory efforts. However, it does seem
reasonable to speculate that the percentage of the American health care
GDP that is devoted to health care regulation is likely much higher than
other developed countries. One element of international comparison, which
comes the closest to regulatory expense. is the amount nations devote to
expenditures on health care bureaucracy and paperwork. The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that the
U.S. spends four hundred billion dollars annually on health care
bureaucracies and paperwork and a major portion of that expense is likely
due to regulatory compliance 6 In contrast to the United States, Canada,
which outperforms the U.S. in many public health quality measures, spends
700 less on paperwork and bureaucracy and likely spends far less on
regulation even though the Canadian system is primarily public.
Beyond broad comparisons of public health measures contrasted with
total national health expenditures, other types of comparative analyses look
at other health care indicators. For example, the Commonwealth Fund
sponsored a research project which entails a comparison of twenty-one
health care quality indicators in five countries broken into two broad areas:

22.

See id.

23. A myriad of comparative statistics on health care systems is reported by OECD and
the
World
Health
Organization,
see
http:/xv-\x..who.int/healthinfo/statistics/
whstatsdownloads/en/index.html (last visited March 1, 2006).
24 Id.
25. See Rep. Tim Murphy, Rx Health Care FYI #17, Paper Costs and Kills, available at
http://murphy.house.gov/UploadFiles/HealthCareFYIl 7.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
26. David U. Himmelstein, Statement on the Administrative Waste in the U.S. Health
Care System in 2003, Public Citizen, Health Services research group, at
http:,.'v .citizen org/hrg/healthcare/articles.cfm?ID=10299 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
27. Id.; see also Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the
United States and Canada, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 768-775 (2003).
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first, outcome indicators, including survival rates for various cancers and
avoidable health events, and secondly, process indicators that focus on the
application of appropriate public health measures, such as disease
screening.:2 An article summarizing results of the Commonwealth Fund
project noted that the United States may achieve better quality scores in
some areas, but in light of the huge difference in expenditures with other
study nations, "the extra spending is probably not buying better
experiences ... with the exception of shorter waits for nonurgent surgery."
29 While the Commonwealth Fund comparative study does not deal with
regulatory costs, its results demonstrate that our high health care
expenditures do not translate into higher quality and must call into question
all the elements factored into the total expenditure, including regulatory
cost.
In the future, another potentially helpful base of comparative analysis
concerns a growing international interest in consumer satisfaction with
health systems. In the U.S.. there has been an ongoing analysis of patient
satisfaction with health care services, which is best illustrated in the area of
health plans through the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems (CAHPS). 30
Europeans are beginning to look at consumer
satisfaction and a research group based in Sweden, the Health Consumer
Powerhouse. has developed the Euro Health Consumer Index that compares
basic consumer satisfaction measures across twelve countries.)
Interestingly, the European countries that spend a considerable amount on
health, such as Sxwitzerland and Sweden, do not necessarily rate higher on
consumer satisfaction scales than those who spend less. 3 2 Using similar
measures to the Euro Health Consumer Index, it would be interesting to
measure whether our costly health system results in greater consumer
satisfaction than what is found in other countries. Just as the quality
comparisons noted earlier do not directly correlate with regulatory costs, so
too would be the case of consumer satisfaction measures. Here as well, low
satisfaction scores and high system costs would call all aspects of health
expenditures into doubt, including regulation.

28. Peter S. Hussey et al., How Does the Qualin' of Healthcare Compare in Five
Countries?HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 2004.
29. Id.
30. See generally The National CAHPS Benchmarking Database (NCBD), available at
http://www.cahps.ahrq.gov (last visited Mar. 1,2006).
31.
Health Consumer Powerhouse, 2005 EuroHealth Consumer Index, availableat
http://www.healthpowerhouse.comImedia/EHCl2005-EN.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).

32.

Id. at 8.
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Ill. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most apparent observation that can be drawn from the
preceding discussion is that far too little is known about the costs and
benefits of health regulation in America. The most basic points, such as a
good general measurement of the individual and collective costs of health
care regulations and the relationship between regulations and
individual/population health, largely remain matters of speculation. In
some instances, we may be able to track the costs of individual program
regulations, but a broader view of costs, which entails compliance and
balance with benefits, is not currently available in the health sector.33
Undoubtedly, addressing the question of value for money in the health care
regulatory sector is an evaluation laced with complexities. Measuring the
sum total of health regulatory costs requires value judgments about what to
include in cost calculations and becomes highly subjective when raw costs
are judged against a list of benefits that allegedly flow from given
regulatory initiatives. Still, there is a need to better understand all aspects
of our expensive health care delivery system, particularly in light of the
growing awareness that other developed countries spend less, but achieve
better population health results. Broad concerns about improving the
quality of our health system in all facets, including regulation, make
assessments of health care expenditures and their ultimate correlation vital
to quality. Comparisons with other nations concerning expenditures on
health and outcomes should not be dismissed on the bases of differences in
populations and delivery mechanisms. Comparative analyses should be
pursued with particular attention to both deciphering how to enhance
quality and reduce expenditures, or at least to contain them.
The role of regulation should not be marginalized as a secondary
consideration in the health care quality and cost debates. Instead, it needs
to be seen as a focal point reflective of the priorities and strategies in this
sector. All aspects of health regulation should be reconsidered - not only
costs, but also broad, fundamental approaches to regulation, as well as,
particular regulatory processes, old and new.
A key aspect of reform will entail proposals to harmonize regulatory
efforts between the states, federal government, and private entities to reduce
costly duplication.
Ultimately creating needed efficiencies in health
regulation is contingent on a national vision of what health care in America
should be, but achieving that consensus remains an elusive goal. For the

33. Supra note 4, HAC Report (the House Appropriations Committee has charged the
HHS Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) with examining the impacts of health care regulation and devising

recommendations for streamlining this area).
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present, the lesser goal of extracting better value for money in health
regulations through various large and small alterations must not be delayed,
as efficiencies in health care are in short supply. In the long term, the
systematic study and reform of health care regulation addresses more than
operational efficiencies, but can be seen as the catalyst for achieving
meaningful progress in improving the quality of the delivery system. In the
extreme, regulatory reform could play a central role in forging a
comprehensive vision for the future of American health care.
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